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SUPREME VERBOSITY:  THE ROBERTS 
????????????????????GACY
MEG PENROSE*
The link between courts and the public is the written word.  With rare 
exceptions, it is through judicial opinions that courts communicate with 
litigants, lawyers, other courts, and the community.  Whatever the court’s 
statutory and constitutional status, the written word, in the end, is the source 
and the measure of the court’s authority. 
It is therefore not enough that a decision be correct—it must also be fair 
and reasonable and readily understood.  The burden of the judicial opinion is 
to explain and to persuade and to satisfy the world that the decision is 
principled and sound.  What the court says, and how it says it, is as important 
as what the court decides.  It is important to the reader.  But it is also important 
to the author because in the writing lies the test of the thinking that underlies 
it. “Good writing,” Ambrose Bierce said, “essentially is clear thinking made 
visible.”1
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I. INTRODUCTION?THE WRITTEN WORD
????????????????????????????????????????????????????legal lexicographer.2
Or, former Circuit Judge, Ruggero J. Aldisert, an authority on judicial 
opinions.3  Or, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), the organization that publishes 
the Judicial Writing Manual: A Pocket Guide for Judges.4  Or, better yet, ask 
the current justices.  With the exception of newly appointed Justice Neil 
Gorsuch, the remaining justices are on record as opposing unnecessarily long 
writing.5  Despite an oft-fractured Court, the justices are unanimous in their 
desire for concise legal writing.  Yet, these same justices are responsible for 
some of the lengthiest opinions in Supreme Court history.6  While past opinions 
were regularly communicated in short order?often by a single justice?the 
Roberts Court regularly issues lengthy, seriatim opinions.  Further, the current 
2. BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH (2d ed. 2001).  Professor Garner 
believes that ?it?s impossible to separate good writing from clear thinking.? Bryan A. Garner, Preface 
to LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH, at xiii (2d ed. 2001).   
3. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING (Carolina Acad. Word Press, 3d ed. 2012). 
4. See SCHWARZER, supra note 1, at vii.  In the First Edition?s Foreword, William W Schwarzer, 
then Director Emeritus of the Federal Judicial Center, explained: 
To serve the cause of good opinion writing, the Federal Judicial Center has 
prepared this manual.  It is not held out as an authoritative pronouncement on 
good writing, a subject on which the literature abounds.  Rather, it distills the 
experience and reflects the views of a group of experienced judges, vetted by a 
distinguished board of editors.  No one of them would approach the task of 
writing an opinion, or describe the process, precisely as any of the others would.  
Yet, though this is a highly personal endeavor, some generally accepted principles 
of good opinion writing emerge and they are the subject of this manual.  We hope 
that judges and their law clerks will find this manual helpful and that it will 
advance the cause for which it has been prepared. 
Id.  The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has this, and many other excellent writing resources, available 
online for free. FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/subject/opinion-writing-legal-writing 
[https://perma.cc/JGN9-C87R] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
5. See Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices, 13 SCRIBES J.
LEG. WRITING (2010) (including interviews with Justices Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito).  Professor Garner interviewed Justices Sotomayor and Kagan after their 
appointments; see also Mary Margaret Penrose, To Say What the Law Is Succinctly, 51 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018).   
6. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (50,870 words); McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (67,053 words).  Ironically, McDonald was a simple 
incorporation case.  McDonald held that the Second Amendment was incorporated via the Fourteenth 
Amendment to apply to the states and their subdivisions. Id. at 778.  It is curious to imagine this limited 
holding would necessitate 17,000 more words than the more difficult substantive decision of whether 
the Second Amendment provided an individual right to possess an operable handgun in the home for 
self-protection, the topic of Heller.
*The word count includes footnotes, internal case citations and all opinions?majority, concurrences, 
and dissents.  The author opted for this fuller word count as it represents the justice?? true output.  
Further, readers are expected to consume the entire opinion.   
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justices frequently render individualized positions in cases without adding 
????????????? ??????? ? ????? ??????? ????????? ???????? ???????? ?????? ???????
inadequate attention to their own writing.7  If words matter, S??????????????
matter in all legal writing? 
Just as words matter, writing matters.  As Judge Re, writing for the FJC 
noted, there is a difference between good legal writing and poor legal writing.8
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????9
The Roberts Court needs to return to good legal writing by improving their 
efforts?both at writing and editing.  Opinions are too long, too confusing, and 
are becoming increasingly inaccessible.  The solution lies in returning to the 
basics?the ABCs. 
II. BACK TO BASICS?SETTING THE EXAMPLE
[T]he purpose of all legal writing is persuasion. . . .  Similarly, 
the purpose of a judicial opinion is to convince any reader that 
sound logic supports the court’s decision. . . .  Excessive 
citation, excessive footnoting and excessive pedantry . . . run[] 
against your sole purpose: to sell your argument to your 
readers.10
The three pillars of good legal writing are accuracy, brevity, and clarity.11
Accuracy is the foundation.  Without accuracy, the entire brief, memorandum, 
or judicial opinion becomes suspect.  If a legal writer cannot get the facts (or 
law) straight, chances are the rest of the document is equally flawed.  Brevity 
and clarity, meanwhile, go hand in hand.  Brevity helps accomplish clarity by 
avoiding unnecessary topics, eliminating adjectives and adverbs, and 
minimizing verbal clutter.  Brevity does not automatically ensure clarity.  But, 
clarity is more apparent in concise writing than in lengthy documents filled with 
endless footnotes or judicial opinions filled with unnecessary dicta.  Good legal 
writing is easy to spot.  But in modern Supreme Court opinions, the ABCs of 
good legal writing are becoming harder to find. 
7. Gerald Lebovits, Short Judicial Opinions: The Weight of Authority, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 64 (2004) 
??Some judges who lament that lawyers? papers are too lengthy are more guilty of overwriting than 
lawyers.???   
8.  Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, U.S. Custom Court, Appellate Opinion Writing, Federal Judicial 
Center 1 (Mar. 11, 1975). 
9. Id.
10. ALDISERT, supra note 3, at 118. 
11. Re, supra note 8, at 2?7.
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They are not only professional writers.  They are the legal voice for our 
country.  They set the example.  Their cases become the training tools for all 
future lawyers.  Their writing serves as the example to law students of how to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ards of 
review, and unclear analysis appearing in Supreme Court opinions serve as 
training tools.  If this is how the Supreme Court operates, it must be how the 
legal profession operates.  If this is how the justices write, this must be how 
lawyers write.   
But, alas.  The justices tell us we, the lawyers, are failing.12  They 
unanimously agree that our briefs are too long.  They explain that just the sight 
of a lengthy brief yields a heavy sigh.13  Did the brief really need to be this 
long?  Ironically, lawy???? ????? ???? ????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????????
Lengthy opinions are met with a heavy sigh.  And, an unclear opinion is met 
with increased expenses for our clients?something the justices never face.  Do 
the justices, whose reading tastes reject lengthy and unclear writing, forget what 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
doing better in their own legal writing?  We may be failing.  But so are they.    
This article challenges the justices, and those working ?????????????????????
to work as hard on their legal writing as they do in rendering their decisions.14
??????? ???? ???????????? ???? ????????????? ???? ???? ????  They must do so in a 
manner that is clear and understandable.  After all, ignorance of the law is no 
excuse.  When complex writing and unnecessary secondary opinions work to 
confuse even skilled legal readers, there is a problem.  The justices must do 
something to correct their growing problem?lengthy, confusing opinions.  The 
Roberts Court is quickly becoming the most verbose Supreme Court in history, 
and i????????????????????
This article offers a solution.  Supreme Court opinions should abide by the 
Supreme Court Rules?in length and format.  Those rules govern the conduct 
of litigants before the Court?? ??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
writing to the same standards?  Opinion length can be governed by the same 
?????? ??? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ????? ???????????? ???????? ???
written after briefing concludes and, in many cases, following oral argument.  
Unlike practicing lawyers, the Court need not survey the universe of case law 
or write on a blank slate.  The issues have already been focused, case law 
presented, and relevant authority cited.  Opinion content can be governed by 
12. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 64.  
13. See id. 
14. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 2 (2d 
ed. 2013) (???]he purpose of the manual is to stimulate judges to think as systematically about writing 
their opinions as they do about deciding their cases??). 
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the same rules as petitions for certiorari, with clarity demanded for questions 
presented, constitutional provisions and statutes relied upon, a statement of the 
?????? ???? ?? ???????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ???? ????
decision.15  And, opinions exceeding 1,500 words should contain a table of 
contents and authorities.16   
Were the justices required to adhere to the Supreme Court Rules, their 
opinions would improve.  ???? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ????????? ???????
accuracy, brevity, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to ready and 
adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration is sufficient 
reason for the Court to deny a petitio????????????????????17  In other words, the 
Court can deny a petition for certiorari literally for poor legal writing.18  Maybe 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????? what the law is clearly.  The time 
has come for the justices to set the example.   
III. FROM JOHN MARSHALL TO JOHN ROBERTS?A FLOOD OF WORDS
During Marshall’s thirty years as chief, “there weren’t 
a lot of concurring opinions.  There weren’t a lot of dissents.  
And nowadays, you take a look at some of our opinions 
and you wonder if we’re reverting back to the English model,
where everybody has to have their say.  It’s more being 
concerned with the jurisprudence of the individual 
rather than working toward a jurisprudence of the Court.”19
John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States20
15. SUP. CT. R. 14.1(h).   
16. SUP. CT. R. 14.1(c).  ??If the petition prepared under Rule 33.1 exceeds 1,500 words or 
exceeds five pages if prepared under Rule 33.2, a table of contents and a table of cited authorities. The 
table of contents shall include the items contained in the appendix.???? see also SUP. CT. R. 24(c)
(imposing same rule for Briefs).  
17. SUP. CT. R. 14.4.   
18. See id. 
19. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 106?07.   
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (presenting the official title of the Chief Justice).  The statute states: 
?The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight 
associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.? Id.  The Chief Justice has not been 
called the ?Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States? since 1866.  Chief Justice Salmon 
Chase urged a bill to change the justices? Circuit riding duties that, incidentally, also changed the Chief 
Justice?s official title. Act of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 205 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1); see also 
William Hornbeck, http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr-online/whats-name-chief-
justices-official-title (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).  
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There have been seventeen Chief Justices of the United State of America.21
Courts, both in their successes and failures, are often referred to under the 
Chief????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1835.22  Chief Justice John Marshall, our fourth Chief, drafted several of the 
?????????????????????????????????   Speaking for the Court, he did so clearly 
and succinctly.23  Marshall e?????????????? ??????????????????????????seriatim (or, 
individually authored) opinions.24  This presented a unified Court at a time 
when the Court needed to enhance its institutional standing.25  The current 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????ful chief justices help their 
??????????? ?????? ????? ???? ???????26  Marshall certainly accomplished this.  
And, he did so without unnecessary elaboration. 
Marshall Court opinions were often brief but powerful.27  There were 
outliers, of course.  Marbury v. Madison, for example, established judicial 
review in 9,500 words.28 McCulloch v. Maryland upheld the federal 
????????????? ?????????? ??? ??????? ?? ????????? ????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ????
????????????????????????????????? ?????29  But, those were atypical cases.  And, 
despite their length, they were clearly written.   
???????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????30  Length is 
???????????????????????????????????????????? in the choice of words is a major 
fault of present Supreme Court opinions, length is of comparable importance.  
Many opinions are composed of a flood of words.  The sheer volume constitutes 
a verbal curtain to communication even to the professional readers,????????????
Constitutional Law professors.31
21. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/BE7L-86SF] (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2018).   
22. Id.
23. See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: “The First Hundred Years Were the 
Hardest”, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 481 (1988).   
24. Id. at 480?81. 
25. Id.
26. Rosen, supra note 19, at 105.   
27. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801) (806 words); Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (158 words); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829) 
(1,013 words). 
28. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
29. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).  And, unlike modern cases, McCulloch was argued over the course of 
nine separate days.   
30. Ray Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions – Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 173 (1995).
31. Id. at 175.   
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??? ?????? ???????? ???????? ??????????? ????????s immediate predecessor, 
noted: 
?????????????? ?????????????????????????????? contributed to his 
preeminence was his ability to explain clearly and forcefully 
why the Court reached the conclusions it did. Marshall had the 
power of clear, logical exposition . . . and his opinions reflect 
it.  They are a breath of fresh air, given that they were written 
at the time when English and American legal writing was often 
shrouded in fog.32
??????????? ????????? ???? ??? ????????? ?????????? ??????? ????? ???? ????????
Court.  By 2010, just five years into his tenure, Roberts presided over the most 
prolix Supreme Court in history.33  In fact, the New York Times reported in 
2010 that the Roberts Court had issued four of the ten lengthiest opinions ever.34
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford, which spans over 110,000 words.35  While 
???????????thirty-four year tenure as Chief resulted in numerous seminal cases, 
many of which are still taught and relied upon today, Roberts is accomplishing 
something Marshall never did?supreme verbosity.  And, despite his 
preference for a more unified Court, Roberts presides over one of the most 
divided, and divisive, Supreme Courts.   
If the present Court adopted the Marshall method of working 
out a compromise, as the legislature does, before announcing 
its new law with one voice, the law would become more clear, 
more succinct, more verbally and logically consistent, and 
more predictable.  This would increase public understanding 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the all-important Rule of Law.36
IV. BY THE NUMBERS: A GROWING PROBLEM
[T]he weaknesses of legal writing have become increasingly obvious and, 
more importantly, have spread to the most influential example of 
American—the opinions of the United States Supreme Court.37
32. Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 481.   
33. Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, 
at A24. 
34. Id.
35. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
36. Forrester, supra note 30, at 179. 
37. Id. at 167. 
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Judicial opinions are becoming more voluminous and less luminous.38  This 
grievance is not new.39  Lawyers have complained about judicial opinion 
lengths for years.40 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ?????????? ????three pages, or four pages or?gasp?six pages.41  Every 
generation complains.  Judges keep writing long opinions.42
In fairness, there was a physical cost to opinion length in the twentieth 
century.  Longer opinions meant more pages.  More pages meant bigger 
books.43  Bigger books cost more money.  And, while this may seem foreign in 
our digital age, lawyers from the 1800s through 1980 relied almost exclusively 
on books.44  Before Westlaw, Lexis, and Google, longer cases impacted a law 
??????? ??????? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ??? ????? ???????????????? ????????? ???al
books to ensure they were current with the law.   
Modernly, the issue is time and accessibility.   
While law offices can now survive without subscriptions to the regional 
reporters and the U.S. Reports, there is a time investment when judges write 
lengthy opinions.  And, for modern Americans who communicate using terser 
language, lengthy opinions run counter to the cultural revolution of concision.  
From Twitter, to Facebook, to Snapchat, individuals want their information 
faster, clearer, and without much effort.  While I am not suggesting the Court 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
think the justices can improve their current approach.  Refusal to appreciate 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????nd, lawyers still bill by the 
hour. 
38. Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (1988). 
39. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 60.  
40. Id. 
41. See id. at 64 (comparing New York state opinions from the 1880s?1970s, which averaged 
between 3.6 and 4.4 pages to the 1980 averages of 5.7 pages to the 1990s average of six pages).  Federal 
cases saw an even larger increase climbing from 2,863 average words in 1960 to 4,020 average words 
in 1980. Id.  
42. Mikva, supra note 38, at 1358.   
43. Id.  (comparing literal page lengths taken up in the printed reporters). 
44. In a telling comment written in 1921, Chief Justice Winslow of the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
noted: 
The law library of the future staggers the imagination as one thinks of the 
countless multitude of shelves that will stretch away in the dim distance, all 
loaded with their many volumes of precious precedents; and as one thinks of the 
intellectual giant that will be competent to retain a knowledge of them, as well as 
the judge that must pass upon the principles involved, one must believe they need 
be supermen, indeed. 
James E. Markham, The Argument in the Decision, 6 A.B.A J. 270, 271 (1921) (quoting Justice 
Winslow).  
2018] SUPREME VERBOSITY 175 
Supreme Court opinions are increasingly accessible to the public through a 
variety of platforms.  Their mushrooming length, however, makes their true 
accessibility a distant prospect.  In 2005, the Roberts Court majority opinions 
averaged just over 4,300 words.45  Five years later, the average length expanded 
to around 5,000 words.46 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
grow, with recent majority opinions averaging over 8,000 words.47  This does 
not include the growing number of?and length attributable to?concurring and 
dissenting opinions.  So, while Americans can freely obtain Court opinions on 
numerous modern devices, it is unlikely this increased accessibility adds 
understanding.  In a perverse twist, as society moves towards more efficient 
communication, the Court is issuing encyclopedic opinions rivaling great 
literary works.   
This disconnect becomes clear in the following chart.  This chart provides 
a page and average word count for all Roberts Court majority opinions from 
2013 through 2017.48  In a telling move, the Harvard Law Review, which has 
been keeping Supreme Court statistics since 2006, first began reporting opinion 
length in 2013.49 ?????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ???? ???? ????????
growing problem, by the numbers. 
45. Rosen, supra note 19, at 111.  
46. Liptak, supra note 33, at A24.   
47. See Table created by author using The Statistics, HARV. L. REV.,
https://harvardlawreview.org/category/statistics (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).  The Statistics, which 
keeps annual data regarding Supreme Court activity, is currently available for Supreme Court terms 
2006?2017.   
48. See Statistics, HARV. L. REV., https://harvardlawreview.org/category/statistics 
[https://perma.cc/HM6M-FR7G] (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).  This author-created chart does not 
include word counts for concurring and dissenting opinions.  Information provided by The Statistics
does.   
49. See ??????????????????????????The Statistics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 408, 415 (2013).  The 
Statistics noted in 2013, ?[t]his is the first year that The Statistics has included data on opinion length.  
Monitoring opinion length by Justice will likely be useful for tracking the writing habits of individual 
Justices over time, as well as for comparing the writing habits of Justices in a given term.? Id. 
176 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:167 
Table:         P = Pages         W = Words 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the first number 
estimates 560 words per page, the second number estimates 590 words per 
page.50
Court Term   Opinions   Avg. Signed Maj. Opinion   Avg. Including PC Opinions 
2013                 78              P: 15.2   W: 8,512?8,968      P: 14.3    W: 8,008?8,437 
2014                 72              P: 17.5   W: 9,800?10,325    P: 16.6    W: 9,296?9,794 
2015                 74              P: 15.2   W: 8,512?8,968      P: 14.3    W: 8,008?8,437 
2016                 75              P: 14.4   W: 8,064?8,496      P: 13.3     W: 7,448?7,847  
2017                 69              P: 13.7    W: 7,672?8,083     P: 12.7     W: 7,112?7,793 
Looking at this chart, a few things become clear.  First, the justices are 
averaging seventy-four opinions per year.  That number is far lower than earlier 
courts that issued (a) shorter opinions, and (b) fewer individual concurring and 
dissenting opinions.  Second, the average majority opinion?meaning the 
average length without considering individual concurring and dissenting 
opinions?is 15.2 pages.  Marbury v. Madison, in contrast, was nine pages.51
Third, the average word count has jumped considerably since 2010.52
There are four potential measurements to assess word count.  But, under 
any of the four, the increase is salient.  If the lower estimate of 560 words per 
page is used, then ??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
signs their name to the opinion) is 8,512 words.  If the higher estimate of 590 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
words.  If the lower estimate of 560 words per page is used against all the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
name to the opinion), the average majority opinion length is 7,974 words.  If 
the higher estimate of 590 words per page is used for all the ??????????????????
including per curium opinions, the average majority opinion length increases to 
8,462 words.53
50. See id. ??A typical slip-opinion page contains approximately 560 to 590 words.???  To give 
readers of this article a clear picture of the potential word counts, I have opted to use both numbers.   
51. Forrester, supra note 30, at 182.
52. Liptak, supra note 33, at A24.   
53. ????? ??????????? ????????? ???? ????? ???????? ????????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????? ????????? ????? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ninth Justice.  Unfortunately, 
once Justice Gorsuch joined the Court, the 2018 numbers returned to the modern norm.  At least nine 
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The increases since 2010 are remarkable.  Using the lower average for 
signed opinions and higher average for all opinions, the current five-year 
average appears to be majority opinions of 8,500 words.  That number becomes 
staggering when you add the average length of concurring and dissenting 
???????????????????????????????????????Concision is a virtue.  Wordiness, not 
complexity, creates long o?????????54
?????????? ????? ???????? ? ???????? ???????? ?????? ????? ?????? ???? ?????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over the past thirty years, we would not have a Supreme Court today of the sort 
that we have, . . . w???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
been eroding, to some extent, the capital that Marshall built up.  I think the 
Court is also ripe for a similar refocus on functioning as an institution, because 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????55
V. LAW AS LITERATURE? FROM SHORT STORIES TO BIBLICAL PROPORTIONS
[O]f the many mansions in the house of literature, law is not one.56
??????? ?????????????????????????????? ???????????? ????????? ??????????? ????
justices? writing to other written works.  In 2010, the average majority opinion 
was roughly 5,000 words.57  Today, those opinions have swollen to 8,500 
words.58  In literary circles, this means the Roberts Court has shifted from 
opinions rivaling short stories to opinions rivaling novellas.  And, again, these 
averages only count majority opinions?not the verbal multiplicity of 
concurring and dissenting opinions.   
Joe Hilland, of the Indiana Review, explained why most publishers limit 
the length of a short story to 8,000 words or less: 
???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
short story as a work of fiction that can be read in a single 
sitting. I like that Poe defines the short story form largely by 
????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
he places a time limit on this interaction?a single sitting. 
cases surpass 20,000 words, including critical cases dealing with search and seizure, presidential 
powers, and immigration.   
54. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 64. 
55. Rosen, supra note 19, at 105.   
56. Felix Frankfurter, When Judge Cardozo Writes, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1931, at 211. 
57. Liptak, supra note 33, at A24. 
58. See Table created by author using The Statistics, supra note 48.  The Statistics, which keeps 
annual data regarding Supreme Court activity, are currently available for Supreme Court terms 2006?
2017.   
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I think most readers would agree that they begin a short 
story with the understanding that, barring any outside 
interruptions, ??????????????????????????????????????????????
For editors, however, the idea that a short story should be read 
in a single sitting raises an important question: How long are 
readers willing to sit with a story? Half an hour? An hour? 
Three hours?  
Like most literary journals, IR places a word limit on 
fiction as part of our submissions guidelines. We accept stories 
of up to 8,000 words, which is probably an average word limit, 
????????? ??? ?????? ????????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ?????
journals that cap their stories at 5,000 or 6,000 words, and 
??????? ????? ????? ?????als that will accept stories as long as 
10,000 words. Journals without word limits in their submission 
guidelines for fiction are, in my experience, extremely rare.  
Editors place word limits on fiction submissions partly as 
a matter of practicality. Longer stories obviously take more 
time to read, and few journals have staffs large enough to 
handle slush piles filled with stories that ask readers to sit with 
them for an hour or more. More importantly, longer stories take 
up more space in the journal, space that could otherwise be 
devoted to work from several other authors.59
Word count averages, as set forth above, tell some of the story.  But, it helps 
to put those numbers?and word counts?into other measurable contexts.  I 
have evaluated Supreme Court opinions in relation to books of the Bible and 
other literary works.  In this way, individuals visualizing the length of modern 
judicial opinions have a reference beyond mere numbers.   
Marsha????? ?????? ???????????? ????????????? ????????? ???????? Marbury v. 
Madison, was equivalent in length to the Biblical books of Revelation or 
Proverbs60???? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ??????? Bartleby the Scrivener.61
Remarkably, Marbury??????????????????????? above the Roberts Court?? current 
five-year average for majority opinions.  The main difference between 
59. Joe Hiland, When Is A Short Story Too Long?, IND. REV. (Feb. 11, 2013), 
https://indianareview.org/2013/02/when-is-a-short-story-too-long/ [https://perma.cc/SHB2-K69P].   
60.  Jeffrey Kranz, Word Counts for Every Book of the Bible, OVERVIEWBIBLE (May 29, 2014), 
https://overviewbible.com/word-counts-books-of-bible/ [https://perma.cc/5C4S-9UH9];  see also 
Felix Just, New Testament Statistics, http://catholic-resources.org/Bible/NT-Statistics-Greek.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XL73-GBBW] (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
61. Word count available at https://www.readinglength.com/book/isbn-1466268778/ 
[https://perma.cc/87TH-QDSN] (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Marshall Court decisions involved a single Court opinion.62
  In contrast, the Roberts Court is increasingly displaying a return to the 
seriatim approach of individually authored opinions.  An illustration is National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Obamacare decision.63
When the various, individually authored opinions are added together, this one 
opinion is 52,395 words.  This gargantuan writing equates to reading the three 
longest of the four Gospels (John, 15,635 words; Luke, 19,482 words; and,
Matthew, 18,346 words).64  That is quite a task when one considers that most 
judicial opinions should be consumable in a single sitting.  
The average Roberts Court majority opinion far exceeds forty of the sixty-
six books in the Bible.65  In fact, in averaging 8,500 words per majority, Con 
Law students are asked to invest?per average case?the equivalent of reading 
Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, and first and second Thessalonians.66  The 
??????????????????????????????????????????????average?was the length of 
the Book of Revelation.67  In fact, the 2014 average majority opinion was as 
long as Marbury v. Madison.68  This growing problem compromises education 
and comprehension.   
These lengthy opinions rival great literary works.  At 8,500 words, one can 
????? ????? ?????????? ???????????? The Ambitious Guest (3,343 words) and
Young Goodman Brown (5,387 words) in the same time it takes to read the 
average Roberts Court majority opinion.69  The average majority opinion is a 
full 1,300 words?or a lit??????????????????????????????????????????The Hour 
(1,009)???????? ????? ?????? ?????? ?????? The Fall of the House of Usher 
(7,226).70
62. See Mikva, supra note 38, at 1359 (explaining the growing length of Supreme Court opinions 
may be due, in part, to the increase in concurring and dissenting opinions).  
63. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
64. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60.  
65. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60 (providing word counts for books in the 
Bible). 
66. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60.
67. Kranz, supra note 60; see also Just, supra note 60.
68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See also author?s table from page 10.  
69. Word counts were either obtained via Hawthorn Mineart?s Word Counts of Famous Short 
Stories, COMMONPLACEBOOK (Jan. 22, 2012), http://commonplacebook.com/writing/word-counts-of-
famous-short-stories/ [https://perma.cc/B2EX-LDA8] or by this author?s downloading the original 
short story and performing a computer-assisted word count. 
70. Id.
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Consuming a controversial case, however, such as Obergefell v. Hodges71
????????????? ???? ??????????????????????????????????????s The Lottery (3,773 
words); ??????????????To Build a Fire (7,176);??????????The Gift of the Magi
?????????????? ???????? The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County
??????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ?????? The Tell-Tale Heart (2,093); Frank 
??????????? The Lady or the Tiger ????????? ????? ?????? ?????????? The Bet 
(2,871).72
Obergefell, at just over 24,000 words, is only half the length of the Roberts 
???????? ????????????????? ???????District of Columbia v. Heller73 (50,870 
words) and McDonald v. Chicago74 (58,597 words).  To cover cases of this 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????The Legend of 
Sleepy Hollow (29,280 ??????????????????????????????Babylon Revisited (7,433 
???????????????????????????The Snows of Kilimanjaro (42,630 words); and 
????????????????The Rocking-Horse Winner (9,150 words).75
Thus, when teaching the two modern Second Amendment cases and the 
same-sex marriage case, a Constitutional Law professor must acknowledge that 
she is teaching the equivalent of an upper-level English literature course.  What 
college students study over a semester, law students must learn over days.  This 
is a heavy pedagogical lift.     
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
removing the opinions from the scrutiny of the governed.  The excessive length 
has the effect of anesthetizing the reader.  The needless verbosity not only 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????76
Judge Abner Mikva observed that excessively long Supreme Court 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
school classroom, the disruptive effect of the epic opinion is quite clear.  Close 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????77  The time 
now required to consume and analyze these opinions is unnecessarily increased.  
Further, because law school casebook editors publish heavily edited versions 
of each case, chances increase that something important will be lost in studying 
a case where lengthy portions have been removed during editing.  It is 
becoming increasingly difficult for professors, and casebook editors, to discern 
the important messages from each case.   
71. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
72. Mineart, supra note 69. 
73. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
74. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
75. Mineart, supra note 69. 
76. Forrester, supra note 30, at 177.
77. Mikva, supra note 38, at 1359.  
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Constitutional law is not intended to emulate English literature courses.  As 
Justi??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????78
Yet, the justices appear not to have received this message.  Instead, judges, 
in writing for too many people, write too much.79 ???]hese twin defects feed 
on each other.  An important consequence of this problem is the disruption of 
the educational process as it unfolds not only in the law school classroom, but 
in the larger world of legal practitioners, and in the still larger realm of informed 
??????????80  Judicial opinions are not intended to be great literary works.  While 
some enjoy the clever, albeit professorial, writing of modern justices, many 
wish the Supreme Court would revert back to simply saying what the law is.  
Consuming a case involving important constitutional rights should not require 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
result of such long and involved opinions is that few people are likely to read 
??????81
VI. THE SEARCH FOR CLARITY AND CONCISION
Unfortunately, bad decisions seem to coincide all too often with opinions 
of excessive length.82
From guns to gay marriage, the Roberts Court has taken opinion writing to 
a new level.  This new level is increasing costs and sowing confusion.  Lawyers 
must read longer opinions and sift through multiple, individually drafted 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
Is this lengthy dissent evidence of what is to come?or, merely evidence of 
what the dissenters wish had happened?  Lawyers, and law students, are reading 
Supreme Court opinions that often lack clarity and concision.   
Constitutional standards of review are no longer obvious.  Take Obergefell 
v. Hodges for example.  The justices wrote five separate opinions totaling 
approximately 24,000 words.83  Critics were unsure whether the Court decided 
the case on Equal Protection grounds or substantive due process.84  At a recent 
Constitutional Law Scholars Forum, a panel discussing Obergefell lamented its 
78. Frankfurter, supra note 56, at 211.  
79. Mikva, supra note 38, at 1369. 
80. Id.
81. Forrester, supra note 30, at 177.
82. Id.
83. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015);  see also Penrose, supra note 5.    
84. Penrose, supra note 5. 
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lack of clarity.85  One presenter indicated he had to read the opinion multiple 
times to discern its meaning.86  The dissenting opinions offered little respite.  
The dissenters?and all four dissenting justices authored individual opinions?
used their writing to chastise the majority, cast pejoratives, and lament the end 
of our democracy.87  The tone was overtly personal and hyperbolic, an approach 
prohibited when filing briefs with the Supreme Court.88  The five opinions 
require a serious time investment yet provide scant legal guidance.   
District of Columbia v. Heller fares no better.89  This Second Amendment 
case intentionally fails to set forth a governing constitutional standard of 
review.90  Is the majority relying upon strict scrutiny, since we are dealing with 
an enumerated right, or something else?  While Justice Scalia liberally, and 
appropriately, criticized the Obergefell majority for creating what appears to be 
a fundamental right but failing to use the traditional constitutional standard of 
strict scrutiny review, his Heller majority commits the identical error.91 Heller
finds self-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but fails to explain why many disfavored individuals, including convicted non-
violent felons, fall outside this protection.92  Justice Scalia explains that there 
are longstanding legal prohibitions precluding ownership by such individuals, 
but fails to cite a single source.93 Heller??? ???????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????? ????
breadth of our Second Amendment rights is why tangential issues keep coming 
85. Id.
86. Id. 
87. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626?43.  Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and 
Justice Scalia all filed individual dissenting opinions.   
88. See SUP. CT. R. 24.  
89. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
90. Id. at 628?29.  
91. Id.  Rather than provide an applicable constitutional level of scrutiny, Justice Scalia?s
majority opinion states: ?Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights, banning from the home ?the most preferred firearm in the nation to ?keep? and use 
for protection of one?s home and family,? would fail constitutional muster.? Id. (internal citation and 
footnote omitted).  Footnote 27 within this quote challenges Justice Breyer?s dissenting approach using 
rational basis review.  But, such argument?placed in a footnote no less?is hardly adequate to advise 
litigants and legislators of the governing constitutional standard of review.   
92. Id. at 626?27.  
93. Id. Justice Scalia?s exact quote reads: ?Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical 
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to 
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, 
or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.? Id.  And, while Justice 
Scalia provides a footnote at the end of this statement, the footnote?s content provides commentary 
rather than sourcing??We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; 
our list does not purport to be exhaustive.??Id. at 627 n.26.  
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before the Supreme Court.94  Unfortunately, since McDonald, the Court has 
provided little guidance. 
Heller and Obergefell, and the numerous dissents attached to both opinions, 
fail the test of Supreme Court Rule 14.4.  Neither case was concise.  Neither 
was clear.  Both add great length to the U.S. Reports without adding equal 
???????????????????????????-???????????????????????????????????????????????????
both offer more confusion than guidance.  The only thing certain about either 
opinion is that decided matters are far from resolved.   
?????????? ?????? ????????? ??????? ??????Plain English for Lawyers, gives 
simple advice for better writing.  Most of his recommended tools were absent 
in both Heller and Obergefell.  In fact, most of his tips seem ignored altogether 
at the highest Court.  Why would the justices eschew the very writing approach 
they crave as readers?  The Supreme Court Rules demanding brevity and clarity 
seem to capture many sage writing tips: 
1. Use simple, commonly understood words;95
2. Eliminate adjectives and adverbs; 
3. Omit needless words;96
4. Eliminate unnecessary footnotes;97 and, 
5. Limit sentence and paragraph length;98
 Good writing techniques yield clearer and more concise writing.  It is the 
writing approach I teach????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
I always keep these thoughts in mind.  Consider the reader.  Make their job 
easier.  Eliminate verbal clutter.  Keep it simple.   
94. E.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 945 (2018) 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Peruta v. California, 824 F.3d 
919 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) (concerning whether an individual has a 
lawful right to carry firearms in public for self-defense); Norman v. Florida, 215 So.3d 18 (Fla. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (involving the right to openly carry firearms); Kolbe v. Hogan, (4th 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (involving the right to own semiautomatic rifles and 
magazines). 
95. GARNER, supra note 2, at 44?65;  see also Rachel Clark Hughey, Age-Old ABCs of Writing 
Applied to the Law:  Accuracy, Brevity, and Clarity, 59 THE FED. LAW., June 2012, at 4, 5 (attributing 
the following to Hippocrates: ?The chief virtue that language can have is clearness, and nothing 
detracts from it so much as the use of unfamiliar words.???
96. GARNER, supra note 2, at 24?27.  Apparently, Professor Garner was channeling his inner-
Thomas Jefferson in doing so, as Rachel Clark Hughey attributes Jefferson as saying, ?The most 
valuable of all talents is that of never using two words when one will do.? Clark Hughey, supra note 
95, at 4; see also ALDISERT, supra note 3, at 274.  
97. See Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647, 647 (1985); Jack 
Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 276 (1989) (reminding that an argument that ?places 
too much of its substantive argument in the footnote was probably not well organized or well written 
in the first place?). 
98. GARNER, supra note 2, at 27?31, 88?92.   
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
any of the individual opinions in Heller or Obergefell in the spirit of Rule 14.4.  
The assignment required that each opinion retain the voice and holding of the 
Court, or individual Justice, but be cut in length by two-thirds.  The results were 
amazing.  The students excelled.  And, the opinions became clearer and more 
concise.  To demonstrate the ease of redrafting these opinions presenting only 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ????
(with her permission) in Appendix A.99  As her work shows, even controversial 
opinions become less objectionable once they become understandable.    
The Roberts Court needs to reassess its writing.  Lengthy opinions are not 
a new phenomenon.100  Lawyers have been complaining for years about opinion 
length.101  Yet, opinions keep growing and growing.102  Empirically, the Roberts 
Court has achieved a new benchmark.  Its opinion averages are the lengthiest 
in Court history?by a wide and growing margin.  I have attached as Appendix 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????s with word counts over 20,000 
words.103  This appendix allows readers to appreciate the expanding verbal 
legacy of the Roberts Court.   
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
research suggests the justices spend inadequate time editing their work.  How 
is it possible that dissenting and concurring opinions are frequently lengthier 
than the majority opinion?  Why are there no governing limitations, or self-
imposed restraints on opinion length?  When will the Court set the example as 
writers they demand as readers?   
?? ???????? ???? ????? ??? ????? ? ?????? ????? ???? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ?????
?????????104
VII. THE PROPOSAL
The short opinion would seem to be the better vehicle for conveying
jurisprudence to farther distances.  Short opinions are more easily and 
generally read than are the longer ones.  The affection of the American people 
for short movie newsreels, crisp radio broadcasts, pictorial essays, novelettes 
99. Jordan Curry, J.D. Candidate Class of 2019, Texas A&M School of Law. 
100. Lebovits, supra note 7, at 60.  
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 64.  
103. Research Chart prepared by Lindsay Willeford, J.D. 2017, Texas A&M School of Law. 
104. Hughey, supra note 95, at 5 (attributing this quote to Nathaniel Hawthorne).  
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and tabloid newspapers, weekly-condensed news magazines and readers’ 
digests, certifies a universal demand for brevity in a swift-moving age.105
The swift-moving age described above was the mid-twentieth century.  The 
twenty-first century edition would agree that short opinions reach wider 
audiences.  YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat have taken the place of 
??????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ????????????
access, is a thoroughly modern value.  Our President communicates via Twitter.  
We receive legal and political news from social media.  Despite the vintage 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? essage is as timely today 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ????????????????????
???????????????????????? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????ith lengthy 
citations, difficult language, and public conversations between the justices 
played out in seriatim opinions.  Readers simply want to know what the law is.     
Americans, in particular, want to understand their legal rights.  Do gays 
have a constitutional right to marry?  Does the Constitution protect the right to 
possess a handgun or an assault rifle?  Can the government force me to buy 
health insurance?  Can the government track my movements by using my cell 
???????? ??????????? ????????? ????? ??ll towers as I drive?  These are critical 
matters for many Americans.  The Court owes us clarity in announcing our 
rights.  What, exactly does the Constitution say about these things?and other 
???????????????????????????????????????????????  The justices have an obligation 
to tell us?briefly.  
I propose the justices live by the rules they have established for litigants.  
The justices should be held to the same maximum length requirements in their 
opinions required in our briefs.  We all share a disdain for long, confusing legal 
prose.  We all need clarity in the law.  And, brevity often brings clarity along 
as its companion. 
With seriatim opinions spanning 20,000 to 40,000 words, and majority 
opinions averaging 8,500 words for the past five terms, the Court has to set a 
limit upon itself.  Majority opinions should be capped at the same length as 
petitions for certiorari.  This would require the justices to work as hard on their 
writing as they do on reaching their decision.  This would elimina????????????
????????????the urge to cite every matter that touches an issue, usually 
resulting in vast overwriting?that young law clerks bring to chambers.  This 
would require the justices to live up to their own standards of accuracy, brevity, 
and clarity. 
105. John D. Martin, The Problem of Reducing the Volume of Published Opinions, J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC?Y, Feb. 1943, at 138, 141.   
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The Supreme Court Rules already address opinions.  Rule 41 requires the 
Clerk of Court release opinions, initially in slip form.106  Why not add a Rule 
that limits the length of these opinions?  Why not add a Rule that limits the 
number of concurrences and dissents to a particular case?  Why not formalize 
the elimination of seriatim opinions by limiting the total length of an opinion?
absent extenuating circumstances?to 9,000 total words?  The Court already 
has a system in place to grant litigants extensions in arguments.107  A rule can 
be crafted giving the same, exceptional relief to the Court.  There are few cases 
that cannot be communicated more concisely than they are now.  Simple cases 
should yield simple opinions.  Complicated cases might yield longer opinions 
but not every case is complicated.  The Roberts Court invests far too much 
energy in obiter dictum.  The point is to say what the law is?not what it ought 
to be.  Worse still, an opinion is no occasion to undermine the integrity of the 
Court or its members.     
Placing word limits on the Court presents a workable solution.  The justices 
control their docket, their chambers, and their law clerks.  They also control the 
rules they are willing to abide by.  If I am limited in the words I can use to 
communicate my case?a case sufficiently important that I sought an audience 
before the C????????????????????????? the Court should be similarly limited.  
Our words should be of equal value.  After all, the Court has the benefit of a 
parsed down record, case law presented through briefing, and on occasion, oral 
argument.  In fact, the justices decide whether to schedule oral argument, which 
provides them even greater opportunity to marshal the facts and law, if 
unclear.108   
The justices should welcome this limitation in the same way that lawyers 
welcome word limits.  At some point, every lawyer must be able to succinctly 
discuss her case.  This task, requiring the sharp editorial tool of summarizing, 
would be a welcome addition to judicial opinions.  In an era where it is all too 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
task of editing?left unchecked?goes unpracticed.  Computers and the 
comforts of modern legal research enable the Court to write and write and write 
and write, without exerting much physical effort.  This contrasts with the days 
of past justices who either wrote in longhand or used actual typewriters.  The 
cases they referenced were in a literal library, not on their cell phones.  The 
important passage in a case could not be found through computerized assistance 
but required one to pour over the pages.  No wonder opinions were short.  The 
job of legal research was exhausting.  And, writing was no easier. 
106. SUP. CT. R. 41.  
107. SUP. CT. R. 28.3.  
108. SUP. CT. R. 28. 
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Today, writing is easier?physically, intellectually, and technologically.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
putting those words on paper.  Their words matter.  The justices should 
approach writing with the understanding that what they seek as readers, we seek 
as readers.  In law, time literally is money.  Time spent reading unnecessarily 
long cases is misspent time.  Instead, the justices should invest their time in 
editing and crafting a product that is accessible.  With the technological 
advancements of the 21st century, accessibility means more than merely the 
ability to find the law.  One must be able to understand the law.   
VIII. IN CONCLUSION, LET ME BE BRIEF109
Supreme Court opinions in recent years increasingly have become 
exercises in individual argumentation and advocacy on the part of the several 
justices. The [Roberts] Court has given new meaning to the word “opinion.”110
Intractable problems are hard to solve.  The issue of long, complicated legal 
opinions goes back a full century.  What began as a call for reform from 
?????????? five to six-page opinions has morphed into a prayer against short 
novels.  The return to seriatim opinions occurred even as Chief Justice Roberts 
heralded a return to consensus.  It turns out, the Supreme Court mirrors the 
division in our country.  But, must it also mirror the divisive discourse and 
constant argument?  Must everyone have their individual say?the ubiquitous, 
Can I finish?   
Now is a time for leadership at the Court, not individuality.  The justices 
must lead our legal community.  In doing so, they will help lead our nation.  
Future discussions should focus on the proliferation of separate opinions.  For 
now, if the justices would curb their prose, all would benefit.  Supreme Court 
opinions are legal pronouncements.  They are the written response to legal 
??????????????????????????111  They should not rival novellas or transform into 
????????? ??????????????? ???????????? ????? ??? ????????? ???????????????????????
political or ideological.  The justices should focus on the law.  Their writing 
would benefit.  Society would benefit. 
109. #irony.  It is hard to defend the use of footnotes for substantive discussion?such as why 
an essay on verbosity needs 8,500 words.  But I will try.  This essay is intended as both a research tool 
and a proposal for clearer, concise judicial opinions.  It provides references for those working toward 
reform and charts a course for further study.  This is also the average length of a Roberts Court majority 
opinion. 
110. Forrester, supra note 30, at 182.
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  
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To achieve concision, the justices should voluntarily agree to adopt the 
same word length limitations the Court imposes on litigants.  They should set 
the example.  They should show us what good legal writing looks like by 
sticking to the issues, writing clearly, and saying only what needs to be said.  
They should consider their own observations about legal writing:  no one ever 
looked at a lengthy opinion and said, I wish that had been longer. 
As accessibility to Supreme Court opinions improves, the justices should 
expect their writing to become more universally consumed.  Their audience is 
worldwide?available on every iPhone, every tablet, and every computer.  
Their writing should reflect this advancement.  More importantly, their writing 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
???????112 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
should do so in a manner we can all understand.   
Now is the time.  Just ask the justices.   
112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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APPENDIX A
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court. 
These cases come to us from the States of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and 
Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union between one man and one 
woman.  See Mich. Const., Art. I, § 25; Ky. Const. § 233A; Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 3101.01 (Lexis 2008); Tenn. Const., Art. XI, § 18.  Petitioners are 
fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased, 
and respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in 
question.  The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Substantive Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying the right to marry or 
have their marriages, lawfully performed in another state, given full 
recognition.  
Petitioners filed these suits in United States District Courts in their home 
states, and each District Court ruled in their favor.  Respondents appealed the 
decisions against them to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  It consolidated 
the cases and reversed the judgments of the district courts holding that a state 
has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages or to recognize 
same-sex marriages performed out of state.  We reverse.  
The issues before the Court are (1) whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two 
people of the same sex and (2) whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize a same-sex marriage 
licensed and performed in a State which does grant that right.  We answer each 
inquiry in the affirmative. 
I
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
rights in the Bill of Rights, and extend also to certain personal choices central 
to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define 
personal identity and beliefs.  See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1968) (holding the right to obtain contraceptives, married or single, is 
fundamental).  Further, identification of fundamental rights requires courts to 
exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so 
fundamental that the state must accord them its respect.  Poe v. Ullman, 367 
U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  History and tradition guide this 
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inquiry, but do not set its outer boundaries.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
572 (2003).  In other words, historical and traditional factors are to be 
considered in defining whether a right is fundamental, but are not always 
dispositive.  
The right to marry is protected by the Constitution.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  Loving invalidated bans on interracial unions holding 
????????????????????????????????????????ights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
?????????????????? ??????Id.  This fundamental right to marriage was reaffirmed 
??????????????????????????????????????????????See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (holding the right to marry was burdened by a law 
prohibiting fathers who were behind on child support from marrying); Turner 
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (holding the right to marry was abridged by 
regulations limiting the privilege of prison inmates to marry). 
Today the Court finds the reasons marriage is fundamental under the 
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples as opposite-sex 
couples.  The Court bases its conclusion on four principles. 
 First, the right to marry is fundamental because the right to personal 
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.  
This is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process 
Clause?choices concerning marriage, namely who to marry, are among the 
????? ????????? ?? ??????? ???? ?????? ? ???????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ????
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not 
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the 
?????????????????????????Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.  The nature of marriage is 
that, through its enduring bond, two persons can find other freedoms, such as 
expression, intimacy, and spirituality.  This is true for all persons, no matter 
their sexual orientation. 
 Second, the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.  
????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this right.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 95?96.  
As the court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as 
opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.  It does not follow that the 
freedom stops there.  Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not 
achieve the full promise of liberty. 
 Third, the right to marry is fundamental because marriage safeguards 
children and families and thus draws a meaning from related rights of 
childrearing, procreation, and education.  See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925).  The Court has recognized these connections by describing 
this g???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????? ??? ????????
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??????????????????Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.  Marriage also confers benefits to 
children by allowing th???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their 
?????? ???????? ?Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694?95 (2013).  
Marriage also affords the permanency and stabil?????????????????????????????????
interests.  Without this permanency and stability, the children of same-sex 
couples would suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.  
These intangible injuries do not exist alone, however.  There are significant 
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents.  For example, drawing on 
the factual scenario of one of the couples involved in this very case, in a state 
that only allows for opposite sex couples or single persons to adopt a child, a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
she has raised if tragedy were to befall the true adoptive parent.  Further, in 
such a state, schools and hospitals may treat children of same-sex couples, 
having been only legally adopted by one of the parents, as only having that one 
parent ignoring the nonadoptive parent who has also raised the child.  Excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the 
right to marry?the safeguarding of children and family. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).  This is evidenced by the varying, but great list of 
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities conferred upon married 
couples by their State.  Thus, the States have contributed to the fundamental 
character of the marriage right by placing it at the center of so many facets of 
the legal and social order.  There is no difference between same and opposite-
sex couples with respect to this principle, yet by exclusion from that institution, 
same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that states have linked 
to marriage.  Exclusion from the status that States attach more and more 
significance to teaches that same-sex couples are unequal in important respects. 
 The Court therefore finds the fundamental right to marry applies to 
same-sex couples in the same way it does to opposite-sex couples. 
II 
 Respondents raise several arguments urging the opposite conclusion as 
is reached here, and the Court addresses some of those arguments in turn, 
finding after consideration that the remainder have no merit. 
 First, respondents note the history of marriage as between a man and a 
woman, and that fact should be dispositive in this case.  But this argument 
ignores the rule set out above, that history and tradition is not always dispositive 
in determining whether a right is fundamental.  Further, the idea of marriage 
has changed over time?history is ever-evolving.  For example, marriage used 
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??? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ????????????? ????????? ???? ???? ??? ?? ??????????? ????????
Additionally, marriage has evolved as the status of woman has changed.  
Marriage is no longer defined as a male-dominated legal entity as it was in the 
recent past.  These changes deeply transformed the structure of marriage, and 
affected aspects of marriage long viewed by many as essential.  Therefore, as 
has happened in the past, the structure of marriage can change again, and 
continue to transform as our society does.  
 Not only has marriage, as an institution, transformed over time, but the 
rights of gays and lesbians have as well.  For example, in the past, gays and 
lesbians were prohibited from most government employment and barred from 
military service, but that is no longer the case.  They used to be excluded from 
immigration law and targeted by the police.  Being gay or lesbian used to be 
deemed a mental disorder, but now is known to be immutable.  Further, same-
sex intimacy used to be outlawed, but is now protected.  States all over the 
country have begun to allow same-sex marriage as protected under their own 
constitutions.  The Defense of Marriage Act, defining marriage as between a 
man and a woman, was invalidated, and the Federal Government now 
recognizes lawful same-sex marriages.  
 Further, the petitioners acknowledge the history of marriage, but 
contend that the history contributes to their desire to marry.  It is the enduring 
??????????? ??? ????????? ????? ?????????? ???? ????????????? ??????? ??? ????? ??????
marriage licensed or recognized?their respect and need for its privilege and 
responsibilities.  And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is 
their only real path to profound commitment.  
 Second, respondents argue that petitioners are not asserting an existing 
fundamental right?the right to marry.  Rather, they are asserting a new and 
nonexistent right to same-sex marriage.  In support of this argument, 
respondents cite Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) which 
?????????????????????????????????????????????ntal rights.  
 However, Glucksberg is not among and is not consistent with the vast 
jurisprudence this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights.  All 
relevant precedent refers to the right to marry in its comprehensive sense rather 
??????????????????????????????????????????Loving), ??????????????????????????????
?????? ???????? ??? ??????? ?Zablocki??? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ???????
(Turner). Nothing in our jurisprudence, therefore, should cause us to define the 
right at issue in this case as ??????????????????-?????????????????????????????????
Glucksberg is distinguishable from the instant case, as it dealt with physician-
assisted suicide rather than marriage. 
 Third, respondents argue there has been a lack of diplomatic discourse 
required to decide an issue so basic as the definition of marriage.  In other 
words, respondents argue that such a decision should be left for the legislature 
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to decide.  But this Court does not have to wait for legislative action to correct 
a constitutional transgression.  Indeed, when the rights of persons are violated, 
???????????????????????????????????????requires ?????????????????????????Schuette 
v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1626 (2014) (emphasis added).  The dynamic of our 
constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative action before 
asserting a fundamental right.  
III 
 The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, 
but rights come not from ancient sources alone.  They rise, too, from a better 
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains 
urgent in our own era.  Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach 
that conclusion based on religious or philosophical premises, which are not 
disparaged here.  But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted 
law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of 
the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose 
own liberty is then denied.  Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in 
marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would 
disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right. 
The Court now holds that same sex couples may exercise the fundamental 
right to marry.  Today this Court overrules decisions inconsistent with this 
opinion.  The state laws challenged by petitioners in these cases are now held 
invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the 
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.  And if states are required 
by the Constitution to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the 
justifications for refusing to recognize those marriages performed elsewhere are 
undermined.  Therefore, this Court holds there is no lawful basis for a state to 
refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on 
the ground of its same-sex character. 
Reversed. 
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APPENDIX B
# Term Case # of Authors Total 
1 2009-2010 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742 (2010). 5 58,597 
2 2011-2012 
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 4 52,395 
3 2009-2010 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 5 46,513 
4 2006-
2007 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 




Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006). 6 43,661 
6 2007-2008 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008). 3 41,033 
7 2007-2008 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723 (2008). 4 37,642 
8 2017-2018 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 2206 (2018). 5 35,189 
9 2014-2015 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 
(2015). 5 33,281 
10 2005-
2006 
League of United Latin American 




Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 
1204 (2018). 4 30,459 
12 2017-2018 
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 
(2018). 3 28,174 
13 2013-2014
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 




Whole Woman's Health v. 




Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018). 5 26,395 
16 2017-2018 
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 1386 (2018). 5 25,773 
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17 2013-2014 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. 
Ct. 2550 (2014). 2 25,534 
18 2014-2015 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015). 5 25,497 
19 2005-2006 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 
U.S. 715 (2006). 5 25,295 
20 2014-2015 
Zivotofsky ex. rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 5 25,115 
21 2017-2018 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. 
Ct. 830 (2018). 3 24,904 
22 2008-2009 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 
557 (2009). 4 24,797 
23 2009-2010 
Skilling v. United States, 561 
U.S. 358 (2010). 4 24,339 
24 2011-2012 
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 
(2012). 4 24,031 
25 2017-2018
Janus v. American Fed'n of 
State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., 




Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 
2502 (2018). 2 22,644 
27 2007-2008 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 
(2008). 7 22,583 
28 2008-2009 
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 
(2009). 2 22,560 
29 2010-2011 
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 
(2011). 3 21,987 
30 2013-2014 
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election 
Com'n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 3 21,412 
31 2006-
2007 
Fed. Election Com'n v. Wisc. 




Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387 (2012). 4 21,100 
33 2017-2018 
Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2165 (2018). 3 20,984 
34 2013-2014 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
572 U.S. 565 (2014). 5 20,956 
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35 2007-2008 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 
(2008). 3 20,622 
36 2012-2013 
United States v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744 (2013). 4 20,592 
37 2013-2014 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 4 20,372 
38 2009-2010 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 
(2010). 5 20,298 
39 2009-
2010 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 
U.S. 477 (2010). 
2 20,107 
